By Sabine Caplin, M.A. International Human Rights
Introduction
The migration, refugee, and asylum systems as we know them today are the product of a long history of policy decisions designed to create a situation where mobility is repressed for specific groups and encouraged for others. Here in the United States, it is common to hear a narrative that those attempting to move to the country, particularly from Latin America, are coming to “steal your jobs,” “hurt your children,” or even “eat your pets.” Unfortunately, this rhetoric surrounding immigration, specifically from the Global South to the Global North, is not confined to just the United States. It has become increasingly relevant to examine as these sentiments become more prominent in the media and among the country’s leadership. The ways people on the move are labelled can shape how they are treated, and anti-immigration rhetoric is pervasive in many countries that receive large populations of immigrants and refugees.
Rhetoric like this is often distilled into specific policies that focus on deterring migration and upping anti-immigrant sentiment among host populations. This is sometimes referred to as “border internalization,” when the policies and attitudes of countries that host migrants aim to deter immigration through making the destination environment more hostile. This op-ed, however, will focus on border extension or “externalization”: the use of regions, policies, peoples, or governments beyond the physical borders of a country to enforce border policies and deter migration. There are two specific cases that exemplify this concept: Türkiye and the EU, and Mexico and the U.S. The comparison focuses on the arrangements established through the 2016 EU–Türkiye statement and the U.S. Migrant Protection Protocols introduced in 2019, and considers their wider implications.
The Case of Türkiye
Türkiye is particularly interesting for this comparison for a few reasons. First and foremost, Türkiye received large numbers of Syrian refugees following the outbreak of war in Syria in 2011. Against a backdrop of economic and political pressures, these increases in the refugee population had heavy ramifications for the country. In addition to responding to displacement, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government had its own political interests at stake. Research on its refugee welfare policies has linked policy choices to the goal of retaining political power.
Germany played an important role in shaping EU migration policy and relations with Türkiye during the 2015–2016 refugee crisis. Migration cooperation developed despite Türkiye’s remaining outside the EU. Under the EU–Türkiye statement of 18 March 2016, new irregular arrivals crossing from Türkiye to the Greek islands from 20 March were to be returned under conditions set by EU and international law. Asylum applications were to be examined individually by the Greek authorities; returns could follow where people did not apply for asylum or their applications were found unfounded or inadmissible. The arrangement required respect for non-refoulement and excluded collective expulsion.
The bargain included an initial €3 billion in refugee assistance and a further €3 billion envisaged by the end of 2018, alongside conditional progress on visa liberalisation, renewed accession discussions, and work on upgrading the customs union. Türkiye’s parallel free trade agreements with third countries, meanwhile, derive from its obligations under the 1995 customs-union framework. Refugee assistance and diplomatic commitments formed the migration bargain; the underlying trade framework long predated it. Through this cooperation, the EU extended migration control beyond its physical frontiers, helping transform Türkiye into a living border.
The Case of Mexico
Mexico is, to an extent, the North American equivalent of Türkiye, and parallels the Turkish situation in many ways. It is a major transit country along migration routes towards the United States, although migrants also seek protection and settle in Mexico itself. In order to understand the migration dynamic that has unfolded in Mexico, it is first important to establish the relationship between U.S. immigration policy and its effect on Mexico, its economy, and its ability to deal with large numbers of people in transit.
During his 2018 presidential campaign, Andrés Manuel López Obrador ran on a platform of reforming and humanizing migration policy and standing up to President Donald Trump and the U.S. on border issues. However, within the first few months of his presidency, faced with tariff threats from the United States, this stance changed considerably. Under pressure from those threats and the newly implemented U.S. Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), also known as “Remain in Mexico,” López Obrador backtracked on his campaign ideals and capitulated to the Trump regime, ramping up immigration enforcement on both the southern and northern borders of Mexico. For example, the Mexican National Guard was deployed to the southern border to detain and deter northward migration from Central and South America.
As introduced in 2019, MPP allowed the U.S. to return certain non-Mexican nationals arriving from Mexico to wait there while their U.S. removal proceedings, including asylum claims, were pending. It did not apply to everyone with a pending immigration case. Mexico accepted the return of people whose cases remained before U.S. authorities. As the Congressional Research Service explains, this differed from safe-third-country agreements that transferred responsibility for examining protection claims to another country.
These policies had several consequences. Most prominently, the burden of caring for migrants waiting on case results from the U.S. put an enormous strain on Mexico’s northern border cities. Responsibility for shelter and other immediate needs fell on Mexican communities while the proceedings determining people’s futures remained in the United States. While López Obrador sought to protect Mexico’s economic relationship with the U.S. through his acceptance of Trump’s demands, the resource and social strain on his country cannot be denied. Under López Obrador, Mexico acted as an extension of the U.S. border, spreading the enforcement zone of U.S. policies and influence all the way to Mexico’s southern border.
Analysis and Conclusion
The cases of both Türkiye and Mexico highlight how migration destinations like the EU and the U.S. expand and externalize the reach of their borders to deter immigration. These two cases also provide insight into the mechanisms through which these external borderlands are manufactured and enforced. In both cases, economic incentives or pressure encouraged cooperation with external migration controls. In the case of Türkiye, refugee funding and diplomatic commitments were central to the bargain, whereas in the case of Mexico, the threat of tariffs was used to force cooperation.
Another distinction is geographical. Türkiye is an important route into the EU, but it is not the only one: migrants also cross the central Mediterranean towards Italy. Greece and Italy have played a large role in immigration enforcement, including the containment and forced movement of migrants in places such as Lesbos and Como. Mexico, meanwhile, occupies a central position on overland routes towards the United States from Central and South America. While these geographical relationships create different options for migrants moving into and through these states, policy decisions made by both the EU and the U.S. have produced similar experiences of containment for many of those affected.
People attempting to reach the U.S. or Europe can become trapped in an extended border zone in which they are blocked from moving forward to their desired destination and are also unwilling or unable to go back home. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits return to persecution, torture, or other qualifying serious harm. It does not prevent every migrant from being returned. For those who cannot safely go home, however, restrictions on onward movement and limited prospects for secure settlement can leave them in prolonged limbo. In addition to the effects on their wellbeing, the strain imposed on host communities can be immense.
Enforcement can also reinforce hostile treatment of migrants. In Türkiye, research on Syrian refugees has documented how policies and practices centred on control and containment cast refugees as security risks, including in the labour market. In Mexico, the shift from humanitarian commitments towards increased apprehensions, detention, and deportation under López Obrador similarly shows how external pressure can narrow the space for protection.
Claudia Sheinbaum’s accession to the presidency in October 2024 did not remove these pressures. In February 2025, she agreed to reinforce the northern border with 10,000 National Guard personnel as the U.S. paused threatened tariffs for a month. The announced deployment focused on drug trafficking, particularly fentanyl, illustrating the continued connection between trade pressure and border cooperation. A change in leadership alone does not resolve the tension between humane migration policy and the economic costs of resisting U.S. demands.
Through these policies and ways of constructing borders, Türkiye and Mexico have become living borders in which European and U.S. migration controls restrict people attempting to reach their final destinations. Economic incentives and diplomatic bargaining in the Turkish case, and aggressive tariff threats in the Mexican case, helped turn these countries into extended enforcement zones. The legal mechanisms differed: the EU–Türkiye arrangement envisaged returns following procedures in Greece, while MPP required those enrolled to await U.S. proceedings in Mexico. Yet both shifted important responsibilities beyond the destination’s territory. For people who could neither move onward nor return safely, the result was prolonged uncertainty, exposure to coercive enforcement, and dependence on the willingness and resources of host communities to protect them.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Tessera Institute for Global Affairs.
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