By Farshid Keramat, Senior Research Fellow
Since the United States has indicated a desire to protect its domestic economy and partially withdraw from the post-World War II trading system, middle powers are scrambling to adjust to this sudden shift in the global order. For many, the answer is China. Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney, recently signaled an economic pivot toward Beijing with a new trade agreement that notably includes the import of 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in return for better access to Chinese markets. This is in addition to a plan to deepen financial integration between the two nations. Brazil has further enhanced its existing trade relations with China across the board and even hosted the 2025 BRICS summit. Likewise, Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently led a delegation of top executives to Beijing to advance the interests of German automotive and chemical sectors.
While appealing on the surface, deeper economic integration with China comes at the risk of long-term political and economic vulnerability. Canada’s past relations with China are instructive. In 2018, when Canada arrested Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou, Beijing immediately retaliated by arresting two Canadian citizens. In 2024, CSIS issued a warning, revealing that Beijing actively engages in political interference in Canada. Only last year, Canada and China were entangled in a trade war over electric vehicles and canola.
The risk of aligning with China is particularly evident in critical minerals. According to the International Energy Agency’s 2025 critical minerals report, China is the world’s leading industrial refiner for 19 of the 20 most important minerals. It holds more than 90 percent of the world’s processing capacity for rare earths and battery-grade graphite. Beijing is leveraging its market control through export restrictions. Canadian defence manufacturers such as CAE have warned that China’s export controls threaten their supply chains.
The restrictions also interfere with key technological innovations Canada is investing in. The most promising future clean energy solution, nuclear fusion (to be distinguished from the existing nuclear fission) relies on rare earth minerals for key components, such as superconducting magnets. In the United States, Chinese export controls are already affecting the development of this critical energy source.
While middle powers are aware of the need for diversification, their efforts have largely focused on other middle powers in Europe and Asia. This strategy is not providing the gains needed to recover lost ground in U.S. markets. Africa offers the substantial diversification middle powers need to retain their political independence, a hallmark of middle-power engagement.
Central Africa is one of the world’s richest sources of critical minerals. The EU has begun investing in the Lobito Corridor, a 2,100 km railroad project connecting the Central African mining belt to the Atlantic Ocean. It is a key geopolitical counterpoint to the Chinese-operated TAZARA railway to the Indian Ocean. Investments in essential supply chains are a step in the right direction. Other middle powers, including Canada, should follow suit.
The opportunities in Africa reach beyond minerals. The continent has significantly advanced its economic integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The agreement aims to eliminate tariffs on 97 percent of intra-continental trade. Middle powers now have a clear point of entry to a 1.4-billion-consumer market with a GDP of $3.4 trillion. Their strengths in metals, automotive manufacturing, and agri-foods offer the high-value exports needed for Africa’s economic growth, including EV components, fertilizers, and agri-processing inputs. This year alone, intra-African trade is projected to grow by 10 percent, or $230 billion.
A major roadblock for increased collaboration in Africa has historically been concerns about the continent’s reliability as a trading partner. It is correct that African nations currently experience varying degrees of political and economic stability. Yet, the trend line is moving toward stability. According to the International Monetary Fund, Africa recorded a GDP growth of 4.5 percent in 2025. Based on data from the World Bank, continental budget deficits have declined from a peak of 3.2 percent of GDP in 2020 to 0.7 percent in 2025. The same data shows that median inflation dropped from 4.4 percent in 2024 to 3.7 percent in 2025. Despite these positive indicators, building lasting trade relations in this region will be a long-term project. Middle powers must therefore engage as an active partner, both politically and economically.
To take advantage of opportunities in Africa and secure independence from global superpowers, middle powers must act. The Lobito Corridor offers a path to securing critical minerals supply chains through investments in extraction, processing, and transport. A secondary advantage is the opportunity to build political ties to a continent increasingly under Beijing’s influence. Many emerging democracies in this region need the support of middle powers to resist economic and political pressure from China, a country that views itself as the leader of the Global South. Beijing considers the liberal world order, including democracy, a threat to its own existence and actively pursues an alternative, Sino-centric, framework. The implications of trade policy go beyond economics. They are part of an underlying systemic competition China is determined to win.
Middle powers are navigating difficult geopolitical times. The unexpected shift in tone from Washington has jeopardized their economies that historically rely on U.S. markets. The urgency this creates must not lead them to mistake short-term pragmatism for long-term strategy, or they risk substituting one dependency for another. Instead, they must stay true to what brought them decades of prosperity—a multilateral, rules-based trading system with like-minded countries. This is the strategic diversification that turns superpowers into trading partners instead of inescapable geopolitical rivals.
* The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Tessera Research Collective.
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